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In this paper, we analyze tax competition in a model where investor firms have the choice 
between two types of investment, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions. We 
show that the coexistence of these two types of investment intensifies tax competition in 
comparison to the case where there is only greenfield investment. If a specific tax on 
acquisitions is available, this result changes. Then, tax competition is mitigated compared to 
the pure greenfield case. The existence of an acquisition tax may even lead to corporate 
overtaxation. 
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The increasing mobility of capital and the growing importance of multinational
￿rms have given rise to an intensive political and academic debate on tax com-
petition and the e⁄ects of taxes on cross-border capital ￿ ows. A large theoretical
and empirical literature has emerged which has signi￿cantly improved our under-
standing of this issue. A characteristic of this literature is that it focuses almost
entirely on green￿eld investment. Building a new plant, however, is not the only
way to realize an investment project. As an alternative, the investor may purchase
an existing ￿rm.
Empirically, mergers and acquisitions (m&a) play an important role. Figure 1
displays the total volume of all m&a transactions worldwide and in Europe (left
ordinate) over time. Mergers and acquisitions come in waves with a peak of more
than three trillion US dollars in 2000 and falling to only one trillion in 2002. The
ordinate on the right depicts the fraction of national m&a, i.e. transactions where
acquirer and vendor are within the same borders, and the sum of national and
intraregional m&a. In contrast to the high volatility in volumes, these fractions
stay virtually constant over time.
What is the di⁄erence between green￿eld investment and mergers and acquis-
itions from a tax policy perspective? In standard models of tax competition1, in-
vestment is modelled as a redistribution of net savings across countries. However,
as recently pointed out by Desai and Hines (2004), m&a do not imply a relocation
of corporate capital but rather a change in ownership and control rights. Clearly,
￿rms which consider a new investment project often have the choice between di⁄er-
ent types of investment, including the acquisition of an existing ￿rm or a green￿eld
investment. It is the purpose of this paper to analyse the implications of this choice
for the welfare e⁄ects of tax competition. How would we expect mergers and ac-
quisitions to a⁄ect tax competition? Intuitively, one could argue that acquisitions
are less tax sensitive than green￿eld investment because taxes are likely to be
capitalized in the purchase price of immobile assets. This might suggest that the
existence of m&a investment mitigates tax competition.
1Standard references are Musgrave (1969) Feldstein and Hartman (1979), Wilson (1986),
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Bond and Samuelson (1989), Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991).
1In this paper, we develop a simple theoretical framework which allows to ex-
plore how the coexistence of m&a and green￿eld investment a⁄ects corporate tax
competition. We assume that investor ￿rms considering a new project ￿rstly screen
the market for existing ￿rms which are suitable as acquisition targets. If they do
not ￿nd an adequate existing ￿rm, they build a new plant (green￿eld investment).
We thus consider a setting where green￿eld and m&a investments are substitutes.
In such a framework, taxes may distort both the decision on the overall number
of projects and the choice to realize these projects as green￿eld investments or on




























































































National + intraregional m&a
Figure 1: M&a volume worldwide (data source: Thompson Financial)
Our results do not con￿rm the view that the existence of mergers and ac-
quisitions investment mitigates tax competition. To the contrary, in the baseline
version of our model, we show that tax competition is intensi￿ed. The reason
is that, due to the existence of m&a investment, green￿eld investment becomes
more tax sensitive. If a country increases its taxes, it does not only lose marginal
green￿eld investment projects, but intra-marginal green￿eld projects are replaced
2by acquisitions of existing ￿rms. This reduces the number of ￿ new￿projects in the
country and, as a consequence, total tax revenue. Put di⁄erently, the introduction
of m&a into the standard tax competition model generates a second ￿scal external-
ity which points in the same direction as the one known from the standard model.
An interesting implication of this result is that high-tax countries are predicted to
have more m&a projects than low-tax countries. But this is not to their advantage
because, at the margin, green￿eld projects generate more tax revenue than m&a
projects.
Things are di⁄erent, though, if one takes into account that tax policy may
discriminate between m&a and green￿eld projects. In this case, corporate tax
competition is mitigated due to the existence of acquisition taxes. We demon-
strate that there may even be equilibria where corporate taxes become too high
in the sense that a coordinated increase of corporate tax rates reduces welfare.
Furthermore, there is a potential for welfare enhancing coordination of the tax
treatment of acquisitions. This also sheds light on attempts by the European
Union to coordinate the tax treatment of cross-border m&a.2
In this paper, we focus on domestic m&a transactions in the presence of an
international market for portfolio capital. We do so in order to relate our analysis
as closely as possible to the standard literature on (harmful) tax competition
and the underprovision of public goods, see the literature cited in footnote 1.
Accounting for international transactions, i.e. cross-border green￿eld and m&a
projects, complicates the analysis by raising issues like repatriation tax schemes,
foreign ￿rm ownership e⁄ects, competition between domestic and foreign investors
etc. These are all important aspects of international taxation, but including them
would complicate our analysis without changing the main insights. We discuss
some of these issues in the extensions section (3.2). Moreover, although cross-
border transactions are more often debated, the bulk of transactions still takes
place within national borders, as ￿gure 1 shows. Our analysis demonstrates that
such transactions are important for international tax competition, as well.
In the public ￿nance literature, Devereux (1990) is one of the ￿rst to shift
2EC level coordination is mainly concerned about discrimination of border crossing relative
to national transactions whereas our argument for coordination also applies to purely national
transactions.
3the focus from capital to ownership allocation. He does not refer explicitly to
mergers and acquisitons but points out that tax distortions to ownership may be
important if capital productivity depends on ownership. The paper introduces
the concept of ￿capital ownership neutrality￿as a property of international tax
systems which avoid distortions in ownership. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) also
consider tax policy in a model where investors may acquire existing ￿rms. But they
concentrate on problems of asymmetric information, and a change in ownership
does not a⁄ect the productivity of existing ￿rms. Fuest and Huber (2004) analyze
tax policy in a model where ￿rms may be sold to foreign investors, but they focus
on the integration of personal and corporate income taxes and do not discuss
tax competition. Moreover, Desai and Hines (2004), as mentioned above, argue
that capital ￿ ows in the form of M&A are likely to have implications for tax
policy which di⁄er from the implications of the standard capital mobility model.
Their main point is that US taxation of foreign source income is likely to distort
ownership patterns and to put US ￿rms at a disadvantage when competing for
foreign acquisitions. They propose to exempt foreign source income from domestic
taxation.3 In Becker and Fuest (2007b), we analyze this argument and show that
exemption is an appropriate policy choice when ownership advantage is a public
good within the ￿rm, but is dominated in welfare terms by a cross-border cash-￿ ow
tax system. Hau￿ er and Schulte (2007) consider tax incentives in a model where
mergers and acquisitions can take place within and across borders. They show
that ownership patterns are highly important for the welfare implications of tax
policy choices.
There is also a growing literature dealing with the impact of globalisation on
mergers and acquisitions, see e.g. Neary (2007). This literature analyses mergers of
￿rms operating in imperfectly competitive markets. In this paper, we deliberately
abstract from imperfect competition and the question of how m&a investment
a⁄ects market structures and trade patterns, mainly because we want to keep our
approach as close as possible to standard models of tax competition. Nevertheless,
we will discuss this issue further in the extensions section (3.3).
Apart from this, the present paper is related to two strands of literature.
3See also Desai and Hines (2003) and the debate between Grubert (2005) and Desai and Hines
(2005).
4Firstly, there are some recent theoretical papers on merger policy, e.g. Hau￿ er
and Nielsen (forthcoming), as well as on M&A and trade policy, e.g. Huck and
Konrad (2004). Empirical evidence on M&A is reported in Andrade, Mitchell
and Sta⁄ord (2001). A second strand of literature deals with capital mobility and
tax competition.4 There is a broad empirical literature on the impact of taxes
on investment and capital ￿ ows, which is surveyed by Hines (1999) and Devereux
(2007). However, virtually all studies treat investment ￿ ows as if they were green-
￿eld projects.
Combining these two literatures raises the question of how taxation a⁄ects
M&A activity. As Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) and Kaplan (1989) suggest,
taxes may be of crucial importance for M&A investment. There are some papers
discussing the impact of the U.S. tax reform on acquisitions of US ￿rms by foreign
investors. Here, the main idea is that the e⁄ective increase in the tax burden caused
by the 1986 tax reform induced investors located in countries with foreign tax credit
regimes to take over U.S. ￿rms because the higher US taxes were credited against
home country taxes (Scholes and Wolfson (1990), Collins, Kemsley and Shackelford
(1995)). Swenson (1994) applies the same argument to US inbound foreign direct
investment and ￿nds robust evidence supporting the hypothesis. In a recent paper,
Huizinga and Voget (2006) study the empirical impact of international taxation
schemes on M&A activity.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. In section 2, we present the
model and the main results. In section 3, we consider some extensions. Section 4
discusses some policy implications and concludes.
2 The model
In this section, we describe the setup of the model and derive a benchmark result
which is based on green￿eld investment. Then, we introduce the opportunity for
investor ￿rms to acquire existing ￿rms.
4For a recent survey see e.g. Fuest, Huber and Mintz (2005).
52.1 The setup
The world consists of n identical open economies. Each country is populated by
a representative household which lives for two periods. The utility function of the
representative domestic household of country i is given by U (C1;C2;G) = u(C1)+
C2 + h(G),5 where C1 and C2 are consumption levels in the ￿rst and the second
period and G is a public consumption good provided by the government in period
2. For notational convenience, we omit the country index unless misunderstandings
may arise. The functions u(C1) and h(G) are strictly concave, with u0 > 0, u00 <
0 and h0 > 0, h00 ￿ 0. In period 1, the household has an endowment of E
units of a numeraire good. This numeraire good may be transformed into the
private consumption good and the public consumption good on a one to one basis.
Households may borrow or lend in the international capital market at the interest
rate r. There are no residence based taxes on capital income.
Households are also endowed with m existing, immobile ￿rms. We refer to
these ￿rms as target ￿rms, as opposed to investor ￿rms which will be introduced
below. Target ￿rms are endowed with immobile capital goods from investment in
previous periods. They do not consider new investment opportunities, but they
may be sold to investor ￿rms. If a target ￿rm is not sold to an investor ￿rm, it
yields an after tax pro￿t ￿(1 ￿ ￿) in period 2, where ￿ is the corporate tax rate.
Thus, under their initial owners, all target ￿rms are assumed to yield the same
pro￿ts. However, we assume that they di⁄er in their suitability as acquisition
targets. This will be explained in greater detail below.
Next to the target ￿rms, there is a large number of investor ￿rms. For nota-
tional convenience, we normalize their number to unity. The representative in-
vestor ￿rm is also owned by the domestic household.6 The investor ￿rm considers
a set of investment projects in its country of residence. In the second period, each
project j yields a project-speci￿c pre-tax return denoted by ￿j . ￿ is assumed to
be uniformly distributed over the interval [￿￿;￿+]. The distribution function is
5We use this quasilinear utility function because it eliminates income e⁄ects on savings which
would complicate the analysis without adding further insights.
6Thus, there is no cross-border investment in the strict sense. However, in the absence
of repatriation taxes, the results derived in this model carry over to the case of cross-border
investment, but get more complex due to the incentive to tax pro￿ts accruing to foreign owners,
as will be discussed in section 3.
6denoted by ￿(￿): The cost of investment in period 1 cannot be deducted from
the corporate tax base in period 2. Thus, the after tax cash ￿ ow generated by
project j in period 2 is given by ￿j(1 ￿ ￿). These projects may be carried out as
green￿eld investments or as acquisitions, which means that the level of ￿j does
not depend on the type of transaction. The cost of investment may di⁄er, though.
If a project is carried out as a green￿eld investment, it requires the investment of
one unit of the numeraire good in period 1. If the project is carried out on the
basis of an acquisition, rather than a green￿eld investment, the investor ￿rm has
to acquire an existing target ￿rm in period 1.
We will proceed as follows. As a ￿rst step, we assume that all projects are
green￿eld investment projects. In a second step, we introduce the opportunity to
acquire existing ￿rms and thus allow for green￿eld and m&a investment to coexist.
2.2 Green￿eld investment
Assume that all projects are carried out as green￿eld investments. In this case, the
investor ￿rm will carry out all investment projects whose return exceeds a critical
value ￿c. The ￿rm will choose this critical value so as to maximize its market












￿(1 ￿ ￿)d￿ (1)
The superscript gf denotes the pure green￿eld case. Maximizing V gf over the
cuto⁄ value ￿c yields the result that, not surprisingly, investment is decreasing in






In the ￿rst period, the household ￿nances green￿eld investment of the domestic
investor ￿rm. In addition, the household may borrow (S > 0) or lend (S < 0) in
the international credit market. The household￿ s budget constraint is
C
gf




7In the second period, the household receives income from savings, pro￿t income




2 = S(1 + r) + m￿ (1 ￿ ￿) +
Z ￿+
￿c
￿(1 ￿ ￿)d￿ (4)
Optimal savings of the domestic households imply
u
0(C1) = 1 + r (5)










Consider next the determination of the interest rate in the international capital




i = 0 (7)
Equations (5) and (7) determine Si, 8i = 1;:::;n, and r, for given values of ￿i.















< 0, i.e. an increase in the tax rate in country
d leads to a decline in the interest rate.7
2.3 Tax competition and tax coordination with green￿eld
investment
Under tax competition, the domestic government maximizes domestic welfare W =
u(C1)+C2 +h(G) subject to the constraints in (3)-(6) and takes the tax policy of
7Note that if n ! 1, then ￿ ! ￿1 and dr
d￿i ! 0.
8the other countries as given. The ￿rst order condition for the optimal tax policy






















where ^ ￿ = argmax￿ W and
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@r







1￿￿. The government faces a trade-o⁄ between raising tax revenue
for public goods provision and distorting investment. In a symmetric equilibrium,
with S = 0, an underprovision of public goods relative to a ￿rst best equilibrium
occurs, i.e. h0 > 1.8
How does a simultaneous change in all corporate tax rates, departing from the
equilibrium without coordination, a⁄ect global welfare? The change in welfare of











The optimal tax policy under tax competition implies @Wd
@￿d = 0. A change in
the tax rate of other countries, though, does a⁄ect welfare in country d because
it a⁄ects the interest rate in the world capital market. Using (8), (10) and the
symmetry property of the equilibrium under tax competition, the overall welfare
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u00 ￿ (1 ￿ ^ ￿)
d^ ￿ > 0 (12)
which implies that a coordinated increase in the corporate tax rate increases
8The ￿rst order condition for the optimal tax rate can be written as @W
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@￿ ] = 0. Using the expressions derived above, this
simpli￿es to @W















@￿ ￿c = 0, so that h0 > 1:
9welfare.
Proposition 1 A coordinated increase in all corporate tax rates, departing from
the equilibrium under tax competition, increases welfare.
This result is well known from the literature on tax competition with green￿eld
investment. The undertaxation result occurs because corporate tax cuts give rise
to negative ￿scal externalities on other countries.9 It serves as a benchmark for
the analysis of tax competition in the presence of mergers and acquisitions in the
following section.
2.4 Adding mergers and acquisitions
We now allow ￿rms to choose between acquisitions and green￿eld investment as
possible ways to realize their project. An acquisition is a substitute for a green-
￿eld investment, but we assume that it is an imperfect substitute. Existing ￿rms
with ongoing production di⁄er in their suitability as target ￿rms. We model this
as follows. If an investor ￿rm decides to carry out a project on the basis of an
acquisition of target ￿rm g, rather than a green￿eld investment, there is an output
loss in period 2 denoted by kg. The variable kg is assumed to be uniformly distrib-
uted over the interval [0;k+] . The distribution function is denoted by ￿(k). The
underlying idea is that green￿eld investment allows the investor ￿rm to set up its
factory and choose a labour force exactly as it suits its interests whereas existing
￿rms will not exactly match the investor￿ s needs.10
What are the tax implications of an acquisition? We assume that the proceeds
from selling a ￿rm are untaxed and that the acquiring ￿rm cannot write o⁄ the
purchase price. This comes close to the usual tax treatment of a share deal,
as opposed to an asset deal. We will discuss the robustness of our results with
respect to this assumption in the extensions section (3.1). In addition, there
is a discriminatory tax on acquisitions which allows countries to tax green￿eld
investment and acquisitions investment di⁄erently. In real world tax systems, such
9The concept of ￿scal externalities is explained in detail in Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991).
10Of course, it may also occur that existing ￿rms have unique assets which make them more
suitable than a newly created ￿rm. It would be straightforward to include this case by allowing
for a negative k.
10a discrimination can be achieved by designing rules for the transfer of reserves,
inter-company dividends, the depreciation of goodwill etc. We summarize this in
a tax on acquisitions denoted by ￿.
The acquisition price is determined as follows. Since some ￿rms are more
suitable as acquisitions targets than others, investor ￿rms will also be willing to
pay a higher price for them. However, the price a vendor may charge is limited
by the fact that the investor ￿rm may always choose a green￿eld investment. In
equilibrium, acquisition prices will be such that the representative investor ￿rm is
indi⁄erent between the two options. This is the case if the price of ￿rm g, P(kg);
satis￿es:




￿j (1 ￿ ￿)
1 + r
￿ 1 (13)
which can be rearranged to
P(k
g) = 1 ￿
kg (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
1 + r
(14)
The initial owner of target ￿rm g will sell the ￿rm if the price is at least as




￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 + r
￿ 0 (15)
It follows that the initial owners of all target ￿rms characterized by a kg satis-
fying kg ￿ kc will sell their ￿rms, where kc is given by
k
c =
1 + r ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ (16)
kc thus characterizes the marginal acquisition, where the vendor is just indif-
ferent between selling and not selling the ￿rm. Acquisitions will only occur if
kc > 0. In the following, we will focus on equilibria where some acquisitions take
place.12 Note further that the tax system is neutral with respect to the number
11The highest possible acquisition price is P (0) = 1 (if ￿ = 0). This implies that the original
investment cost to create the target ￿rm, net of output generated in previous periods, must have
been lower than 1.
12An equilibrium where no green￿eld investment occurs is also possible, but will be neglected
in the following.
11of acquisitions if ￿ = ￿(1 + r), see (16). In the absence of an acquisitions tax, the
corporate tax distorts the choice between acquisitions and green￿eld investment
in favour of acquisitions, i.e. kc is higher than in the absence of corporate taxes.
Figure 2 illustrates the model. The ￿rst margin, which determines the overall
number of investment projects, is de￿ned by ￿c = 1+r
1￿￿. For a given r, neither
the initial pro￿t level ￿ nor the acquisition tax ￿ will a⁄ect the total number of
investment projects carried out in the country under consideration. Note, though,
that changes in all these parameters may a⁄ect the equilibrium interest rate r. The
second margin is de￿ned by (16) and determines the number of projects realized





















Figure 2: Two decision margins.
Not surprisingly, an increase in the acquisition tax ￿ reduces the number of
acquisitions. In contrast, an increase in the corporate tax rate c.p. leads to an




1 + r ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
2 > 0 (17)
The reason is that the higher corporate tax is capitalized in the purchase price
for existing (immobile) ￿rms whereas the price of new capital does not change
12(given r). Thus, acquisitions become more attractive relative to green￿eld invest-
ment. An increase in the interest rate also leads to more acquisitions and less
green￿eld investment. The reason is that a higher interest rate means that new
capital becomes more expensive. This increases the incentives to use ￿ old￿capital.














￿(1 ￿ ￿)d￿ ￿
Z kc
0
(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)k)dk (18)
In period 1, expenditure for green￿eld investment is equal to the overall number
of projects which are carried out,
R ￿+
￿c d￿. For each acquisition, the ￿rm has to
pay the acquisition price P(k), but it can reduce its expenditure on ￿new￿capital
by one unit. In period 2, the cash ￿ ow is reduced by the tax on acquisitions and
the after-tax output loss (1 ￿ ￿)k.
Competition between investors drives up the prices of target ￿rms so that
investor ￿rms are indi⁄erent between acquisitions and green￿eld investment. As
a result, the equilibrium value of the investor ￿rm does not depend on the mix
between green￿eld investment and acquisitions. Using P(kg) =
1+r￿kg(1￿￿)￿￿
1+r , the











￿(1 ￿ ￿)d￿: (19)
This re￿ ects that the surplus created by using existing ￿rms rather than new
capital fully accrues to the initial owners of the target ￿rms. The maximization of






Thus, the marginal project is a green￿eld project in the sense that the overall
number of investment projects realized in the country under consideration is de-
termined by the cost of green￿eld investment. The mix between green￿eld projects
13and acquisitions depends on the availability of suitable target ￿rms. More form-
ally, the number of acquisitions is determined by (16). The remaining projects are
realized as green￿eld investments.
Consider next the budget constraints of the private household and the govern-
ment. The budget constraint of the domestic household in period 1 can be written
as









Compared to the pure green￿eld case, the household can reduce the expenditure
for investment in period 1 by using ￿ old￿rather than ￿ new￿capital, i.e. by increasing
the number of acquisitions. The second period budget constraint is given by











￿(1 ￿ ￿)d￿ ￿
Z kc
0
(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)k)dk
Here, the the existence of acquisitions a⁄ects consumption opportunities as
follows. The second term on the right hand side of (22) re￿ ects that the household￿ s
income from ongoing ￿rms is now smaller because some of them have been acquired
by the investor ￿rm. The third and the fourth terms represent the pro￿ts from new
investment (based either on acquisitions or green￿eld projects) net of acquisition

















(￿ ￿ ￿k)dk (23)
Each additional acquisition increases tax revenue by the acquisition tax ￿ and
reduces it through the output loss k and by decreasing the number of ongoing
￿rms, so that tax revenue declines by ￿(￿ + kc), at the margin.
142.5 Capital market equilibrium




i(r;￿i), i = 1:::n, implied by (16)
and (20), the capital market equilibrium is determined by the ￿rst order conditions
for optimal savings ui0 = 1 + r, i = 1:::n, and the credit market equilibrium
condition
P
i Si = 0 . These n + 1 equations determine optimal savings Si ,
i = 1:::n, and the interest rate r, for given values of the tax instruments ￿i and
￿i, i = 1:::n. Thus, the interest rate in the international capital market can be

































< 0. Equation (24) shows that, as expected, an
increase in the tax rate ￿i reduces the interest rate. An increase in ￿i, in contrast,
increases the interest rate because it reduces the number of acquisitions while the
overall number of projects carried out in country i remains constant. As a result,
capital demand for green￿eld investment in country i increases, and this drives up
the interest rate.
2.6 Tax competition
Again, we assume that countries set their tax policy to maximize the welfare of the
representative domestic household and take the tax policy of the other countries
as given. In the presence of acquisitions, the ￿rst order condition for the optimal
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15where ^ ￿ = argmax￿ W and ^ ￿ = argmax￿ W, as de￿ned below. How does the
coexistence of green￿eld investment and acquisitions a⁄ect the optimal tax policy?
An increase in the corporate tax raises revenue, as re￿ ected by the ￿rst term on
the right hand side of (26), and changes the corporate tax base, as the second
term indicates. In contrast to the case of pure green￿eld investment, there is a
second margin which a⁄ects the tax base. An increase in the corporate tax induces
￿rms to replace green￿eld investment by acquisitions. For a given interest rate,
the e⁄ect on tax revenue is equal to ￿
￿
^ ￿ (￿ + kc) ￿ ^ ￿
￿
@kc
@￿ . Finally, tax policy
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which can be simpli￿ed to @W
@r = S￿h0 2^ ￿(1+r)￿^ ￿
(1￿^ ￿)2 . What is the di⁄erence between
this expression and the one from the pure green￿eld case? Next to the e⁄ect on
interest income (re￿ ected by S), a rise in r lowers the total number of projects
realized in the domestic country. This is re￿ ected by an increase in the cuto⁄level
￿c. In addition, the number of acquisitions increases (kc rises), which a⁄ects tax
revenue as discussed above.
How are taxes on acquisitions set in a tax competition equilibrium? The ￿rst
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Using (27) and kc = 1+r￿^ ￿
























The optimal level of ￿ is given by:
^ ￿ =




















d￿ < 0;5 for all n and u00, the right hand side of (30) is unambiguously
positive. It thus turns out that the acquisitions tax which emerges under tax
competition is positive. However, it is ambiguous whether or not the tax system as
a whole discriminates acquisitions relative to green￿eld investment (as mentioned
above, neutrality requires ^ ￿ = ^ ￿(1 + r)).13
2.7 Tax Coordination
Is there any scope for welfare enhancing tax coordination? Consider ￿rst a co-
ordinated change in ￿, departing from the equilibrium under tax competition and
holding constant the acquisition tax ￿. The e⁄ect on the welfare of the country












@￿d = 0 holds in the equilibrium under tax competition, and using
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The ￿rst term in the parentheses on the right hand side of (32) reveals that the
existence of mergers and acquisitions gives rise to an additional ￿scal externality
of corporate tax cuts. A corporate tax cut in other countries increases the interest
rate. This leads to an increase in acquisitions (@kc
@r > 0) or, more precisely, to a
substitution of green￿eld investment by acquisitions. The increase in acquisitions
may increase or decrease tax revenue, depending on whether ￿ (￿ + kc) ￿ ￿ is
positive or negative. If ￿ = 0, (16) implies that tax revenue declines as green￿eld
investment is replaced by acquisitions. In this case, a negative ￿scal externality
arises, which reinforces the standard externality due to the decline in the overall
number of projects. The latter is captured by the second term in the parentheses
13It is straightforward to show that ^ ￿ > ^ ￿(1+r) emerges if the number of countries n is large,
which implies that @r
@￿ converges to zero.
17in (32). This implies that the possibility of replacing green￿eld investment by
acquisitions (and vice versa) unambiguously intensi￿es tax competition if there is
no acquisitions tax. In contrast, if there is such a tax, the situation is di⁄erent
because the sign of the ￿scal externality caused by the existence of acquisitions
becomes ambiguous. Equation (32) can be rearranged to
dW
d = h








Given (24), it is easy to show that this expression may in general be positive
or negative. We summarize this in
Proposition 2 In the absence of a tax on acquisitions, the possibility of repla-
cing acquisitions by green￿eld investment gives rise to an additional negative ￿scal
externality of corporate tax cuts. Tax competition is intensi￿ed. A coordinated
increase of the corporate tax increases welfare.
Proposition 3 In the presence of an acquisitions tax, a coordinated increase of
corporate tax rates is welfare enhancing if ^ ￿ < 2^ ￿ (1 + r) and reduces welfare if
^ ￿ > 2^ ￿ (1 + r). If ^ ￿ = 2^ ￿ (1 + r), the di⁄erent ￿scal externalities compensate each
other and coordination does not a⁄ect welfare.
Proposition 3 implies that the question of whether corporate tax rates are
too high or too low under tax competition depends on the level of the acquisi-
tion tax. As pointed out in the preceding section, ^ ￿ is unambiguously positive in
the tax competition equilibrium, but whether it exceeds 2^ ￿ (1 + r) is, in general,
ambiguous. Given that the standard model with only green￿eld investment unam-
biguously leads to undertaxation, the question arises whether a negative welfare
e⁄ect of a coordinated corporate income tax increase is possible. The appendix
provides an example showing that parameter ranges exist where ^ ￿￿ 2^ ￿ (1 + r) > 0
holds in the equilibrium under tax competition. We may thus state:
Proposition 4 The opportunity to levy a tax on acquisitions mitigates tax com-
petition. In the presence of an acquisitions tax, a coordinated increase in corporate
tax rates may reduce welfare.
18The result in proposition 4 shows that taking into account the existence of
m&a investment in the analysis of tax competition is important because one of the
benchmark results in the theory of corporate tax competition - the ￿nding that tax
competition leads to an undertaxation of corporate pro￿ts, is called into question.
The economic explanation for this result is the following. A tax cut in country i
drives up the interest rate r. This will reduce the level of green￿eld investment in all
other countries. Since the taxes on the marginal green￿eld investment are positive,
tax revenue and, hence, welfare in these countries declines. But at the same time,
the higher interest rate leads to an increase in the number of acquisitions. If the
tax on acquisitons is su¢ ciently high, this has a positive impact on overall tax
revenue. The second ￿scal externality may dominate the ￿rst, so that the ￿scal
externalities of corporate tax cuts may in fact be positive in our model.
Is there any scope for welfare enhancing tax coordination of acquisition taxes?
The welfare e⁄ect of a coordinated tax change, departing from the equilibrium










Using (27) and (25), this can be expressed as:
dW
d = h
0(^ ￿ ￿ 2^ ￿ (1 + r))







2u00 ￿ (1 ￿ ^ ￿)
￿
d^ ￿ (35)
We may therefore state
Proposition 5 Departing from the equilibrium under tax competition, a coordin-
ated reduction in the tax on acquisitions increases (reduces) welfare if ^ ￿ < 2^ ￿ (1 + r)
(^ ￿ > 2^ ￿ (1 + r)).
The welfare e⁄ects of tax coordination of both ￿ and ￿ depend on whether ^ ￿ is
larger or smaller than 2^ ￿ (1 + r). This is not surprising because in our model ￿scal
externalities are transmitted through the interest rate in the international capital
market. If ^ ￿ < 2^ ￿ (1 + r), tax changes which drive up the interest rate give rise to
negative ￿scal externalities and vice versa.
193 Extensions
In this section, we consider three extensions of the above presented model. In
subsection 3.1, we show that our results are robust to modi￿cations in the tax
treatment of acquisitions. Subsection 3.2 discusses the implications of cross-border
acquisitions. In subsection 3.3, we provide a brief discussion of imperfect compet-
ition and its importance for the analysis of mergers and acquisitions.
3.1 Taxation of capital gains and deductibility of acquisi-
tion expenditures
An important but certainly restrictive assumption we have made is that the rev-
enue from selling the ￿rm, which accrues to the initial owners, is not subject to tax,
and the investor ￿rm cannot deduct the purchase price. The tax consequences of
acquisitions are important in our model because it is relevant for a key e⁄ect which
drives our results: the ￿nding that a higher corporate income tax induces ￿rms
to replace green￿eld investment by acquisitions. The question is how robust this
result is. An alternative approach would be to assume that the vendor has to pay
tax on the revenue from selling the ￿rm while the acquiring ￿rm may deduct the
purchase price. This would be a simple way of modelling the usual tax treatment
of an asset deal, as opposed to a share deal. In this case, the investor ￿rm will be
indi⁄erent between acquiring any ￿rm g and making a green￿eld investment if
(￿j ￿ kg)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
1 + r
￿ P(k
g)(1 ￿ ￿) =
￿j (1 ￿ ￿)
1 + r
￿ 1: (36)
The initial owners will sell their ￿rm if
P(k
g)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 + r
￿ 0 (37)
This implies that all target ￿rms characterized by a level of k satisfying k ￿ kc
will sell their ￿rms, where kc is given by
k
c =
1 + r ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ (38)
20which is identical to the expression in equation (16). The reason is that, com-
pared to the baseline version of our model, the tax disadvantage of the vendor is
exactly equivalent to the tax advantage of the buyer. It is straightforward to show
that our results are robust with respect to di⁄erent ways of treating acquisitions
for tax purposes, provided that the vendor and the seller are treated symmetrically.
Situations where this is not the case are captured by our parameter ￿.
3.2 Cross-border m&a investment
So far, our analysis has been restricted to national acquisitions. What happens if
we allow for cross-border acquisitions in our model? The simplest way of introdu-
cing cross-border acquisitions is to assume that the investor ￿rms from one country
also untertake green￿eld investments and acquisitions in other countries. Since the
location of the headquarter of the investor ￿rms does not play any economic role
in our model, this would be equivalent to assuming that investor ￿rms which un-
tertake projects in country i are owned by residents of some other country i. This
would change our results only in so far that the desire to tax pro￿ts accruing to
foreign residents would be added as an additional motive to tax corporate pro￿ts.
It is well known that this may lead to corporate overtaxation under tax compet-
ition (Huizinga and Nielsen (1997)).14 Of course, cross-border acquisitions would
also raise issues like double taxation agreements or pro￿t shifting. We are con-
￿dent that adding these elements to the model would not change the key insights
provided by the analysis, but a thorough analysis of these issues may nonetheless
be valuable. We leave these questions for future research.
3.3 Imperfect Competition among Firms
Another limitation of our analysis is that we abstract from what is widely seen as
an important factor for mergers and acquisitions: the existence of imperfect com-
petition among ￿rms. We have deliberately done so in order to keep our model as
close as possible to the standard model of (harmful) tax competition. An altern-
ative approach to analyse the role of m&a investment for tax competition would
14In an earlier version of this paper, we considered a framework with border crossing acquisi-
tions. The results of the analysis are available from the authors on request.
21be to start with a model of oligopolistic competition and add intergovernmental
￿scal competition to it. Several additional issues would arise in this case. Firstly,
m&a investment may change the number of ￿rms in the market. If one ￿rm which
is active in the market acquires another active ￿rm, consumers may be negatively
a⁄ected by increasing prices. However, if the merger paradox applies, mergers will
only arise if they give rise to synergies, which has further implications for both
consumers and the ￿sc. It is even possible that prices decline, due to lower mar-
ginal costs of the newly created ￿rm. Of course, green￿eld investment may also
change the number of ￿rms in a market. In general, e⁄ects of investment on the
intensity of competition in markets for private goods are not only an issue for tax
policy but also for competition policy and merger control. Secondly, if the desire
to reduce competition is a factor driving m&a investment, green￿eld investment
would not be considered as a substitute. Possibly, a framework without green￿eld
investment would be appropriate. There is no doubt that these issues are worth
to be investigated in models of ￿scal competition. But doing so would divert at-
tention from the focus of this paper. In addition, the e⁄ects arising in our model
are also likely to be relevant in models which do account for imperfect competition
among ￿rms.
4 Discussion and concluding remarks
This paper departs from the observation that the literature on international tax
competition has neglected the role of mergers and acquisitions. It mainly focuses
on green￿eld investment although the former type of investment is empirically at
least as important as the latter. We therefore suggest a simple framework which
introduces mergers and acquisitions into a standard tax competition model. In-
vestor ￿rms choose between acquiring existing ￿rms or realizing green￿eld projects.
We show that, if we abstract from the possibility of levying a speci￿c tax on ac-
quisitions, the introduction of m&a investment intensi￿es tax competition because
it gives rise to an additional negative ￿scal externality of corporate tax cuts. In-
terestingly, an increase in corporate taxes raises the number of acquisitions in a
country but reduces the total number of investment projects. Therefore, a tax
increase does not only a⁄ect the quantity of investment but also its composition
22and, hence, its quality in terms of welfare.15
If an acquisition tax is available, uncoordinated policies lead to a positive tax in
our model. Whether the tax system as a whole discriminates acquisitions relative
to green￿eld investment in a tax competition equilibrium is ambiguous. If the
number of countries is large, a systematic discrimination of acquisitions relative to
green￿eld investment emerges. The existence of the acquisition tax implies that
the ￿scal externalities of corporate tax rate changes are di⁄erent. If acquisition
taxes are su¢ ciently high in the uncoordinated equilibrium, the ￿scal externality
which arises due to the existence of m&a investment becomes positive. As a result,
corporate tax competition is mitigated, and it may even be that overtaxation
occurs.
In terms of policy implications, our analysis draws attention to the fact that
corporate tax coordination which focuses on the (tax inclusive) cost of capital
for green￿eld investment is incomplete. The tax treatment of acquisitions is an
important factor as well. Clearly, it has to be taken into account that our model
only highlights a rather speci￿c aspect of mergers and acquisitions: the possibility
of replacing a green￿eld investment by an acquisition. There are many other
factors driving mergers and acquisitions investment, and these factors are likely
to be relevant for the workings of tax competition as well. This is an agenda for
future research.
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Appendix: An example for corporate overtaxation
due to the existence of m&a
In this appendix, we show that the tax competition equilibrium may indeed imply
￿ > 2￿ (1 + r), so that corporate overtaxation (i.e. a positive welfare e⁄ect of
corporate tax rate reductions) emerges. We do so by providing a simple example
which makes the following assumptions.16 The number of countries n is large, so
that @r
@￿i converges to zero. The representative household￿ s utility function takes
the quadratic form
u(C1) + C2 = (a ￿ bC1)C1 + C2 (39)
where a and b are positive parameters. Assume further that h0 = ￿ > 0 and
h00 = 0. ￿ and k are uniformly distributed, with ￿￿ = 0. ￿ is normalized to zero.
With the budget constraints given by (21) and (22), optimal period 1 consump-
tion is given by C1 =
a￿(1+r)
2b which implies savings of







a ￿ (1 + r)
2b
(40)
Due to symmetry, S = 0 holds in equilibrium. Therefore, (40) determines
r. The total number of projects is given by ￿+￿￿c
￿+ m and the total number of
acquisitions is kc
k+m . Note further that kc2
2k+m =
R kc




16A more detailed description of how we derived the results in this example is available upon
request.
26Equations (26), (28) and (40) determine the equilibrium values of ￿, ￿ and r.
Starting with the optimality condition for ￿, we can solve for ￿ and replace it in
(40). Then, the resulting expression for r is replaced in (26). Assuming parameter
values for ￿, m, E, k+, ￿+, a and b, ￿ can be determined iteratively. If ￿ = 1:25,
m = 20, E = 10, k+ = 1, ￿+ = 3, a = 10 and b = 0:5, the equilibrium values are
^ ￿ = 0:35, ^ ￿ = 0:97, r = 0:19 (41)
which implies 2^ ￿ (1 + r) < ^ ￿.17
17Note that these parameter values also imply 1+r > ￿, which makes sure that an equilibrium
with a positive number of acquisitions is considered.
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